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Frazer, Wittgenstein and the Interpretation
of Ritual Practice
Felicia DeSmith
Frazer and Wittgenstein, anthropologist and
philosopher, are two thinkers whose works have
profoundly shaped the development of their respective
fields in the 20th Century. The difference between them
is that Frazer’s work is now widely dismissed, even
ridiculed, while Wittgenstein’s ideas, such as language
games, are still a strong part of the philosophical
endeavor.
This fact is made interesting by the
intersection of the works of these two. Though his
thoughts were not published until 1979,1 Wittgenstein
began to comment on the faults in Frazer’s works as
early as 1931,2 specifically upon his presentation of
ritual practice among ‘primitive’ peoples as foolish and
mistaken. To Wittgenstein and many other modern
thinkers, this patent dismissal of ritual practice was
troubling and needed to be corrected. Wittgenstein
gives us a good starting place to understand the
significance of ritual practice, but to accomplish it, one
must go beyond his explanation in the Remarks on
Frazer’s Golden Bough.
In this paper, I will discuss Frazer’s introduction of
ritual practice as bad science, Wittgenstein’s textual
response to Frazer, and the common view of
Wittgenstein’s response held by his commentators. I
will argue that Wittgenstein’s later view needs to be
1

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough.
Retford: Brynmill Press Limited, 1979.
2
1931 is an important date for understanding Wittgenstein’s
thought in the Remarks. It falls between the Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus (1921) and the Philosophical Investigations (1953).
It is in the Remarks that we begin to see the transformation of his
ideas toward the form in which they appear in the Investigations.
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incorporated into the discussion, and expanded and
clarified to truly show the reason for the persistent
misunderstanding of ritual practice.
Frazer
James Frazer was an anthropologist of the
Victorian era, very much a product of British colonial
imperialist thought. His major accomplishment is The
Golden Bough, a 13 volume anthropological work,
published over the years of 1890 to 1936, which
describes ‘primitive’ magico-religious, or ritual practice
and attempts to find overlying archetypes of thought
and evolution. Most importantly, Frazer attempts to use
his findings to support an evolutionary theory of culture,
that is, the theory that so-called ‘primitive’ religious
thought can give modern thinkers an insight into the
developmental history of their own culture and into the
nature of religious belief (that is, its erroneousness).
To this end, Frazer identifies ritual practice as a
scientific endeavor, the initial groping of a primitive
culture towards the understanding and certitude that
science provides. It is a clumsy prototype, a (perhaps
necessary) precursor to the finished product that is
rigorous scientific methodology.
Frazer says of
magical practice, “its fundamental conception is
identical with that of modern science; underlying the
whole system is a faith, implicit but real and firm, in the
order and uniformity of nature.”3 For Frazer, and for
the purposes of this paper, science is defined as an
exploratory activity based on empirical reasoning to try
to explain, manipulate and control the properties of the
world.

3

Frazer, J. G. The Golden Bough (abridged edition). London:
Macmillan, 1922. 49.
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The reason that ritual practice is the prototype of
science, and not, according to Frazer, science itself, is
that it is based on a fundamental error.
“The fatal flaw of magic lies not in its general
assumption of a sequence of events determined by law,
but in its total misconception of the nature of the
particular laws which govern that sequence.” 4
“Legitimately
applied they
yield science;
illegitimately applied they yield magic, the bastard sister
of science. It is therefore a truism, almost a tautology, to
say that all magic is necessarily false and barren; for if it
were ever to become true and fruitful, it would no longer
be magic, but science.”5

For Frazer, ritual practitioners are stricken with a basic
misunderstanding of the practical principles that govern
reality. The reasoning that supports the ritual structure
is faulty; it is a mistake. And, working from a faulty
beginning, the end is faulty as well, forever consigning
magic to be that false and barren bastard sister of
science.
Wittgenstein
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s
Golden Bough is a two-part work. The first part was
written between 1930 and 1931 after his first contact
with The Golden Bough in the summer of 1930. These
remarks were dictated to a typist and much rearranged,
seemingly as a kind of starting point for thought about
his major later work, the Philosophical Investigations.
The second set of remarks is quite fragmentary, actually
rough notes and penciled scribbles found among his
4
5

Ibid. 49.
Ibid. 49-50.
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things posthumously by Elizabeth Anscombe, one of
Wittgenstein’s literary executors, a translator and a
commentator. They appear to be meant as insertions to
his earlier remarks.6 In the first part of the Remarks,
one can definitely see the beginnings of some of the
ideas that will characterize his later view.
As a first step, Wittgenstein rejects Frazer’s
notion that magico-religious practice is founded on a
basic mistake in reasoning, essentially a kind of
persistent stupidity, where the ritual practitioner insists
on the correctness of his action in spite of its direct
contradiction by the nature of reality. Wittgenstein
writes:
“Frazer’s account of the magical and religious
notions of men is unsatisfactory: it makes these notions
appear as mistakes.” 7
“It is very queer that all these practices are finally
presented, so to speak, as stupid actions.
But never does it become plausible that people do all this
out of sheer stupidity.”8
“Frazer says it is very difficult to discover the error
in magic and this is why it persist for so long—because,
for example, a ceremony which is supposed to bring rain
is sure to appear effective sooner or later. … But then it
is queer that people do not notice sooner that it does rain
sooner or later anyway.”9

The source of the strangeness of Frazer’s account, for
Wittgenstein, is that magical and religious activity is
defined by its erroneousness, and a ritual practitioner
would have to be stupid to continue on practicing.

6

Rhees, Rush. Introduction. Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough.
By Ludwig Wittgenstein. Retford: Brynmill Press Limited, 1979.
v-vi.
7
Wittgenstein. 1979. 1.
8
Ibid. 1.
9
Ibid. 2.
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At any rate, Wittgenstein goes on to point out
that ritual practitioners, or ‘savages,’ have a clear
understanding of what science is and what it should be
used for, and they separate it from the things that
should be addressed by ritual.
“The same savage who, apparently in order to kill his
enemy, sticks his knife through a picture of him, really
does build his hut of wood and cuts his arrow with skill
and not in effigy.”10

This is to say, where science is needed, science is used.
And it is used correctly. Only when there is some need
to accomplish or comment on something beyond the
bounds of science, do men turn to magico-religious
practices.
This rejection of ritual practice as a purely
scientific endeavor, as well as some of his comments in
the Remarks 11 have led some of Wittgenstein’s
commentators to characterize his position in the
Remarks to be a new and complete theory of religion:
an expressivist theory. According to Brian Clack,
“(b)oth Michael Banner and John Cook see the
distinctive feature of Wittgenstein’s approach to
religious phenomena as being the idea that such rites
‘express attitudes’ towards things: towards the world,
one’s own life and death, and so on.” 12 In the
expressivist interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Remarks,
magico-religious and ritual practice is in no way an
attempt to accomplish something based on the rules of
nature, nor to explore some kind of speculation or

10

Ibid. 4.
Such as, “... magic does give representation to a wish; it
expresses a wish.” Ibid. 4.
12
Clack, Brian. Wittgenstein, Frazer and Religion. New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1999. 28.
11
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theory about those same rules, but simply to express an
emotion or stance on the human condition.
I disagree completely with this analysis of
Wittgenstein’s position in the Remarks. It shows a
shallow understanding of some of his more problematic
notes. This can be illustrated by a remark and its
footnote:
“If the adoption of a child is carried out by the
mother pulling the child from beneath her clothes, then it
is crazy to think that there is an error in this and that she
believes she has borne the child. *” 13
* “The same principle of make-believe, so dear to
children, has led other peoples to employ a simulation of
birth as a form of adoption. ... A woman will take a boy
whom she intends to adopt and push or pull him through
her clothes; ever afterwards he is regarded as her very
son...” (The Golden Bough, pp. 14, 15)”14

In this case, if we just read the remark itself, one can
see the idea the expressivists are arguing from. The
woman does not believe that she has born the child, but
it is the case that she has shown something, that is her
intent to adopt the child and her commitment to provide
for him. At this point in the Remarks, it seems that
Wittgenstein considers the matter closed, making no
more explicit commentary about this particular case,
and moves on to his next example.
But if we look also at the note Wittgenstein
includes from The Golden Bough, the expressivist
analysis of that action becomes complicated. In not
taking Wittgenstein’s remark as a direct response to a
statement of Frazer’s, the commentators are missing a
vital piece of the puzzle. It is not just that the woman
indicates that she wishes to adopt the boy, it is that
13
14

Wittgenstein, 1979. 4.
Ibid. 4, footnote.
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through the performance of that ritual, the boy has
become ‘as her very son.’ A change has occurred both
in the social structure of the group and in the nature of
the relationship between the woman and the boy. Their
bond has been altered and cemented. It is clear that the
ritual was undertaken in order to accomplish something,
that is, the change in the relationship between them.
In general, in rituals that resemble the one above
in their form and intent, the ritual practitioners not only
have a very clear idea of what they want to accomplish,
they also have a very clear idea of how it comes about.
By performing a symbolic birth, the adoptive mother is
seeking to effect a change on the symbolic attributes of
herself and her adoptive son (i.e. their relationship to
one another, both in a functional social way and in a
meaningful, ‘ontological’ way; he becomes her very
son). This change occurs on the basis of the understood
properties and mechanics of the manipulation of
symbolic attributes in much the same way a
mathematician knows that induction works on the basis
of the properties and mechanics of the set of natural
numbers. The change or proof that we want to
accomplish in either case is borne out because of the
very nature of the mechanics that change operates on.
In both cases, it must hold.
Critique of Wittgenstein’s Remarks
In my interpretation of Wittgenstein’s response
to Frazer, Wittgenstein is trying to show that Frazer is
confused in exactly the same way a philosopher
becomes confused; moreover, in my analysis, to clear
up this confusion is the agenda of Wittgenstein’s entire
career. It is the single common element between the
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the Philosophical
Investigations. The aim of both is to show that the
cause of philosophical torment is a specific sort of
65

confusion about what can be said, or about what can be
evaluated in what contexts.
In order to properly get at this confusion, we need to be
able to talk in terms of depth grammar. To do that, I
need to turn to the Philosophical Investigations, first
published in 1953, many years after the first remarks on
Frazer were written, but which has much of its
preparatory work in the Remarks itself. In section 664
of the former, Wittgenstein writes:
“In the use of words one might distinguish ‘surface
grammar’ from ‘depth grammar.’ What immediately
impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the
way it is used in the construction of the sentence, the part
of its use—as it were—that can be taken in by the ear.
And now compare the depth grammar, say, of the word
“to mean,” with what its surface grammar would lead us
to expect.”15

In other words, surface grammar is that which involves
the rules of syntax that words have within a sentence
and depth grammar is the meaning of an utterance
within the language game to which it belongs.
Moreover, depth grammars exist only as an attribute of
the language game to which they belong; a depth
grammar cannot exist separate from its context, its
language game.
Philosophical confusion arises when one takes a
language object, such as a noun or a verb (i.e. “God” or
“to mean,” etc.), and tries to make sense of it on the
basis of its surface grammar alone. Mere syntax does
not reveal the meaning of a language object in its
language game, nor does it even show to what language
game the language object belongs. If we act in
15

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G. E.
M. Anscombe. 3rd Ed. New York: Macmillan Publishing
Company, 1968. § 664.
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ignorance of the proper context of a language object,
then of course we become confused.
In order to understand the proper domain of a
language game and the function of the language objects
that belong to it, Wittgenstein proposes the idea of a
perspicuous presentation. The word he uses in German
is übersicht, a kind of complete, ultimate sight. Rhees
notes that he only chooses this word in translation
because there is no English word that means precisely
what Wittgenstein means by übersicht. At that time, no
one was using the word ‘perspicuous’ in English to
have any specific connotations. I find that the fact that
it was unsullied, lacking accretions, is what makes the
idea intelligible to readers of English in the first place.16
Übersicht is also sometimes translated as ‘synoptic
view’ or ‘bird’s eye view.’ 17 But what does this
‘ultimate sight’ see? What is its purpose? Wittgenstein
attempts to explain in the Remarks:
“For us, the conception of a perspicuous
presentation [a way of setting out the whole field together
by making easy the passage from one part of it to another]
is fundamental.”18
“This perspicuous presentation makes possible that
understanding which consists just in the fact that we ‘see
the connections.’”19

Nowhere, though, does Wittgenstein explain or name
the object of übersicht, beyond saying that it allows us
to “see the connections.”
Wittgenstein, in a sense, gives us two ways to
look at the same thing, two ways of pointing at the heart
of the matter that he never names or explicitly
characterizes. On the one side, there are the language
objects and their depth grammars. On the other side is
16

Wittgenstein, 1979. 9, translator’s note.
Clack, 1999. 58.
18
Wittgenstein, 1979. 9.
19
Ibid. 9.
17
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the comprehension of the connections between the
elements of a language game. But what of the
connections themselves? What is the thing that we
understand? What is the thing that is made of the
connections? In order to do what Wittgenstein wants to
do with language, someone has to define and give an
account of this thing. Wittgenstein never did because
he wanted to avoid proposing some kind of unified
theory, yet in order for his account of language to make
sense, that thing needs to be rigorously explained. To
give a clear view of this hidden concept is what I will
now try to accomplish, though in doing so I will go
beyond that which Wittgenstein himself explicitly
stated.
To understand a language game, to have a clear
perspicuous presentation of it, one must be aware of the
connections between the elements of a language game.
These elements are the language objects, their depth
grammars, how they interrelate, how they function on
one another, etc. It is to have an understanding of the
complete combinatorial, permutational properties of the
relationships of all the elements to one another. It is to
understand the fundamental nature of the concepts of
the language game and how they function within that
language game. It could be called something like
‘fundamental concept functionality.’ It could also be
called the metaphysics of a language game; though I
hesitate to use that term, since the very property that
made ‘perspicuous’ for Rhees a good candidate for
specificity in philosophical terminology makes
‘metaphysics’ a very bad candidate for it.
In
philosophy, the term ‘metaphysics’ has become so
overburdened with accretions that it cannot be applied
to something so narrow and specific as what we are
speaking about here. Though the power of the analogy
cannot be denied, and it is useful to keep it in mind, I
am going to attempt to use the unburdened new term
68

‘fundamental concept functionality’ where its
unburdenedness does not complicate understanding.
The idea that the heart of a language game, its
machine code, as it were, is a kind of cohered whole of
the combinatorial relationships of the elements of that
language game suggests to me a kind of taxonomy of
language games, based on the shared elements of
fundamental concept functionality between related
language games. It is useful to think of language games
themselves as being interrelated, by a sort of family
resemblance model, into a loose framework that gives a
picture of language as a whole. Since language cannot
occur outside of a language game, all communication
must share some basic element that makes each
instance of communication able to be considered a part
of a language game. All language must have a common
aspect of its functional concept functionality in order
for it to be language at all. This gives us the first tier in
the taxonomy of language games, that is, language
games themselves.
The second tier of the taxonomy would contain
broad categories of types of language games, such as
social interaction, science and religion. The second tier
should make some distinctions between different
domains of language activity, for even at this level, a
degree of specificity and exclusion begins to arise.
Though this taxonomic view is quite helpful in
illustrating the different ways that language is divided
up by its use, it is important to remember that the
groupings occur because of shared elements of the
‘metaphysics’ of the language games involved. The
spaces between the branches of the taxonomic tree
represent ‘lines in the sand,’ across which language
objects and concepts from specific language games
should not (and cannot sensically) be transported.
Generally speaking, then, Frazer’s mistake is in
taking ideas out of one language game and bringing
69

them into another, taking them out of the language
game of religion and subjecting them to the
‘metaphysics’ of the science language game. He is
violating a divide in the taxonomic organization. What
he does, over and over again in the pages of The Golden
Bough, is seize upon some idea or practice, loosen it
from the tethers of meaning and significance that tie it
into the use and function of the language game of ritual,
and take it singularly into a strange environment where
its original meaning and significance, its use and
function, are no longer valid.
Specifically, the problem with Frazer’s
transportation of religious language objects into the
science language game is that the science language
game does not admit of an important aspect of the
fundamental concept functionality of the religion or
ritual language game. Above, when we looked at the
example of adoption through the performance of a
symbolic birth, we saw that the important part of the
ritual is that the symbolic attributes of the mother and
son were altered; that is, she became his very mother,
and he became her very son. In magico-religious
practice and ritual, the symbolic attributes of a person
(i.e. ‘is the son of,’ ‘is sinful,’ ‘is ritually pure,’ etc.) are
very important. In science, they are trivial. One cannot
determine if a person is sinful using scientific
implements, nor does it tell a scientist anything about
the empirical properties of that person. In addition, the
rules of the science language game do not acknowledge
that through the manipulation of symbols, symbolic
attributes can be changed.
This idea, so central to magico-religious and
ritual practice, of the nontriviality of symbolic attributes
and the ability of symbolic attributes to be altered
through symbolic action (or performance) is something
I am going to call ‘symbolic causality.’ It is the aspect
of the fundamental concept functionality of the magico70

religious language game that allows for the
relationships between symbols, symbolic attributes, and
symbolic actions to be acted upon reliably,
mechanically, in the same way, as I mention above, that
inductive proofs work reliably, mechanically because of
the relationships between the elements in the series of
natural numbers.
Take for example, in Christianity, the
transubstantiation of the host. In a scientific account of
it, ritual participants listen as the ritual practitioner
speaks some words, calling on his God to bless the food
that is the center of the ritual. Then the participants eat
some bread and drink some wine. And at the end of it,
they believe that in some way they have partaken of the
body of their savior. They have all pretended, like
make-believe, that the wine became blood and that
there is something salvific in the action of drinking it.
But nothing empirical has changed, except that now
they have eaten and drunk a bit. Yet anyone familiar
with the Christian sacrament of the Eucharist knows
that to dismiss it as make-believe is to completely
misunderstand the point of the ritual. Most do not
believe that the wine really, actually becomes blood,
but they do believe that the wine has taken on the
symbolic attributes of Christ’s blood, being both his
blood and just wine at the same time. In an inescapably
analogous way, a woman does not believe that she
actually gave birth to her adoptive son, but he is still her
son.
This fine distinction, empirically wine but
symbolically blood, is not given any importance in the
science language game, but it is of vital importance to
the language game of Christianity.
Science does not admit of the validity of
symbolic causality; in the fundamental concept
functionality of science, it does not exist. Indeed, the
very idea is in some ways anathema to the language
game itself. Small wonder, then, that when Frazer tries
71

to make a scientific account of a ritual practice, he sees
it as crazy and wrong. And small wonder that readers
of Frazer who are sensitive to the differences between
science and magic, like Wittgenstein, are frustrated
constantly by his accounts because it is so gratingly
apparent that he is missing something vital.
The way in which Frazer could have conducted
his anthropological work without it being wrongheaded
and disrespectful would be, instead of evaluating ritual
thought and action in terms of science and trying to
patch up ‘savage’ practice and make it appear rational,
to have attempted to understand and describe the
important aspects of ritual practice in their own terms.
In light of the discussion in this paper, the proper aim of
anthropology and religious studies 20 should be
description, to understand and describe the fundamental
concept functionality, the metaphysical properties, of a
specific ritual language game by observing the thought
and activity of ritual practitioners. The aim should be to
provide Wittgenstein’s übersicht, to provide a
perspicuous presentation of what goes on and why, to
prevent
Frazer’s
kind
of
confusion
and
mischaracterization regarding the elements of ritual
activity.

20

And, according to Wittgenstein, the proper aim of philosophy as
well.
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